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Background: There is evidence for a group of nonclinical 
individuals with full-blown, persistent psychotic experi-
ences (PEs) but no need-for-care: they are of particular 
importance in identifying risk and protective factors for 
clinical psychosis. The aim of this study was to investigate 
whether reasoning biases are related to PEs or need-for-
care. Method: Two groups with persistent PEs (clinical; 
n = 74; nonclinical; n = 92) and a control group without PEs 
(n = 83) were compared on jumping-to-conclusions (JTC) 
and belief flexibility. A randomly selected subset of inter-
views (n = 104) was analyzed to examine differences in expe-
riential and rational reasoning. Results: As predicted JTC 
was more common in the clinical than the other 2 groups. 
Unexpectedly no group differences were observed between 
clinical and nonclinical groups on measures of belief flex-
ibility. However, the clinical group was less likely to employ 
rational reasoning, while the nonclinical group was more 
likely to use experiential reasoning plus a combination of 
both types of reasoning processes, compared to the other 2 
groups. Conclusions: Reasoning biases differ in groups with 
PEs with and without need-for-care. JTC is associated with 
need-for-care rather than with PEs. The ability to invoke 
rational reasoning processes, together with an absence of 
JTC, may protect against pathological outcomes of persis-
tent PEs. However, marked use of experiential reasoning is 
associated with the occurrence of PEs in both clinical and 
nonclinical groups. Implications for theory development, 
intervention and further research are discussed.
Key words:  jumping-to-conclusions/psychotic 
experiences/need-for-care/experiential and rational 
reasoning/cognitive models of psychosis
Introduction
There is growing evidence for the existence of a group 
of nonclinical individuals with full-blown, persistent 
psychotic experiences (PEs) but no need-for-care.1 These 
are individuals with persistent, nondistressing PEs, and 
they show few signs of distressing delusions or paranoia.1 
They also show a flexible range of benign (typically nor-
malizing, often spiritual) appraisals of their anomalous 
experiences2,3; they do not show the threat-related, mal-
adaptive appraisals commonly seen in clinical groups.4,5 
As such this group is of particular importance in iden-
tifying risk and protective factors for clinical psychosis.
One protective factor that may distinguish this unique 
group is an absence of the reasoning biases associated 
with maladaptive appraisals of anomalous experience. 
Individuals with distressing delusions, specifically, make 
decisions on the basis of limited evidence in probabilistic 
reasoning tasks: the so-called “jumping-to-conclusions” 
(JTC) data-gathering bias.6 JTC is exacerbated in acute 
states, and may represent a trait vulnerability7 and a 
prognostic marker.8 Work on JTC has led to investiga-
tions into belief  flexibility, defined as the metacognitive 
ability to reflect on one’s own beliefs,6 and the related bias 
against disconfirmatory evidence (BADE),9,10 defined as 
the neglect of counterarguments for decision-making. 
Lack of belief  flexibility is commonly reported in people 
with clinical delusions, with typical rates ranging between 
50% and 75%,6 and is a related but distinct process to JTC 
and belief  conviction.11 To date, belief  flexibility has been 
studied almost exclusively in the context of clinical delu-
sions. The flexible range of benign explanations of experi-
ences observed in individuals with persistent nonclinical 
PEs, make JTC and belief  flexibility constructs of interest 
for understanding the absence of threat appraisals in this 
group.4,5
The definition of belief  flexibility (ie, an ability to step 
back, consider the possibility of being mistaken and reflect 
on alternative explanations) overlaps with the analytic, 
controlled “type 2” reasoning identified in dual-process 
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models of cognition.12 Recent investigations of reasoning 
and psychosis have drawn on Epstein’s cognitive-experi-
ential self-theory (CEST) and associated nomenclature 
of “experiential/ intuitive” (emotion based) and “ratio-
nal” systems.13 Modest positive correlations have been 
found between experiential reasoning and paranormal 
and superstitious beliefs and schizotypy, with rational 
reasoning showing the converse relationship.14–16 Freeman 
et al16 also found that a perceived reliance on experiential 
reasoning is associated with paranoid thinking in the gen-
eral population, while reliance on deliberation (rational 
reasoning) is associated with fewer paranoid thoughts. 
These studies point to the relevance of dual-process mod-
els to the psychosis continuum; in particular suggesting 
that rational reasoning may be associated with reduced 
paranoia while over-reliance on experiential (emotion-
based) reasoning may be associated with unusual beliefs 
and paranoia across the psychosis continuum.
In summary, studying individuals with persistent 
nondistressing PEs with no need-for-care can illumi-
nate protective factors mitigating the risk of  transition 
to clinical psychosis. It is important to distinguish this 
group from individuals with an “at risk mental state” 
(ARMS) and those in the general population scoring 
highly on measures of  delusion-proneness, on the lower 
end of  the continuum of  risk of  psychosis, where ele-
vated paranoia would be expected and evidence of  rea-
soning biases would be predicted.7,17,18 We hypothesize 
that these groups will differ with respect to reasoning 
biases; and more specifically that the absence of  the 
clinically established biases in JTC and belief  flexibility, 
together with differences in dual-process reasoning may 
help to explain the adaptive meaning-making in this 
unique group.
Aims
The primary aim was to investigate whether JTC and 
belief  flexibility are associated with need-for-care rather 
than PEs alone: individuals with persistent PEs, with and 
without need-for-care, and a control group without PEs, 
were compared on responses to standardised assessments 
of JTC and belief  flexibility. A  secondary aim was to 
compare how the three groups reason about their PEs/a 
personally meaningful belief, applying a dual-process 
framework (detailed in the “Methods” section).
Hypotheses
1. The clinical group will be more likely to show JTC 
than nonclinical and control groups, who will not dif-
fer from each other.
2. The nonclinical and the control groups will be more 
likely to demonstrate belief  flexibility about their own 
beliefs and a control belief, than the clinical group.
3. JTC will be associated with belief  inflexibility (possibil-
ity of being mistaken) across the sample (replicating6).
4. The nonclinical group will score more highly than the 
clinical group on rational reasoning. Group differ-
ences in experiential reasoning will be explored.
Methods
This was a planned study within the UNIQUE study.1
Participants
Three groups were recruited across 2 sites (Urban—South 
London; Rural—North Wales): (1) patients with PEs 
(diagnoses F20–F39) (clinical group; n = 74); (2) individ-
uals with PEs without need-for-care (nonclinical group; 
n = 92); (3) controls with no PEs (n = 83), matched to 
nonclinical group in age, gender, ethnicity, and education.
Exclusion (all groups): (1) age <18; (2) insufficient 
English; (3) neurological history, head injury, epilepsy; 
(4) primary substance dependence; (5) estimated IQ <70 
(10 individuals otherwise meeting criteria for the clinical 
group had estimated IQ below 70 and were excluded on 
the basis that reasoning task performances may not be 
valid.)
Main inclusion criterion for clinical/nonclinical groups 
was evidence of current PEs (past month/ in clear con-
sciousness), scoring ≥2 (“occasional”) on at least one item 
of the Scale for the Assessment of Positive Symptoms 
(SAPS19). Specific inclusion criteria for nonclinical group: 
(1) experiences started ≥5 years previously (avoiding pos-
sibly prodromal individuals); (2) did not score 2 (“unmet 
need”) on basic self-care and “psychological distress” 
items (relating to PEs) of Camberwell Assessment of 
Need Short Appraisal Schedule (CANSAS20); (3) no pre-
vious contact with mental health services/general practi-
tioner (GP) regarding PEs (nor anyone on their behalf); 
(4) no previous contact with specialist mental health pro-
vision not available through general/family practitioner; 
(5) judged by research worker to not be in need-of-care 
for PEs. A  specific exclusion criterion for controls was 
endorsement of any unusual experience item at screen-
ing; see1 and online supplement.
Measures
Appraisals of Anomalous Experiences Interview 
(AANEX2). A semi-structured interview, eliciting cur-
rent PEs, and associated emotional/cognitive correlates. 
Part one (AANEX-Inventory, short form21) comprises 
17 anomalous experiences (including hearing voices, 
somatic experiences, experiences of reference, thought/
mind permeability), rated on a 3-point scale (1 = not pres-
ent; 2 = unclear; 3 = present; range 17–51) over lifetime, 
and currently (past month). Inter-rater reliabilities (IRR; 
N = 35; 16 clinical, 19 nonclinical) indicated almost perfect 
agreement (intra-class correlation coefficient (ICC) > .8): 
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total (ICC  =  .995); current (ICC  =  .997); lifetime 
(ICC = .998). Experiences elicited by AANEX-Inventory 
anchored Part two (AANEX-CAR; context, appraisals 
and response), including belief  flexibility items.
JTC Bias—The Beads Task. JTC was assessed using a 
computerised (difficult; 60:40) version of the data-gather-
ing beads task.6 Number of beads drawn prior to decision 
(maximum 20)  was recorded. JTC has been operation-
alised as a decision made after ≤2beads.6 Decision convic-
tion and accuracy were recorded.
Belief Flexibility. Assessed using 2 standardized, widely 
used items6,11: (1) possibility of being mistaken22 and (2) 
alternative explanations.23 Both are scored yes/no indicat-
ing presence/absence of flexibility. For clinical and non-
clinical groups the anchor was the main belief about the 
cause of PEs (ie, flexibility was assessed in the context of 
explanations of experiences rather than specific delusions, 
as in earlier studies). Illness/biological attributions were 
treated in an identical fashion to other explanations, that 
is, individuals were asked whether they might be mistaken/
to generate alternative beliefs. Controls were presented 
with five beliefs in order to identify a comparable person-
ally significant belief24 about a fundamental issue (God 
exists; There is an afterlife; The climate is changing due to 
human factors; Everything happens for a reason; There is a 
higher force at work in the world). They were asked to select 
the item that was “...most important to the way in which you 
think about the world- you can either agree or disagree with 
the statement you choose- the important thing is that the 
statement is one that matters personally to you.” If no item 
reached a 70% personal significance threshold, they were 
asked to generate their own belief (relating to the physi-
cal or metaphysical nature of the world or the functioning 
of society; purely value-based judgments/opinions were 
excluded given methodological issues identified in a pre-
vious study (Belief flexibility data were only available for 
45 of the control group. This comprised 18 males (40.0%) 
and 27 females; mean age of 47.4 years (range 21–73); 40 
(88.9%) self-identified as “white” background; 35 (77.9%) 
were in employment/education/training. There were no 
significant differences between those that provided belief  
flexibility data compared to those that did not on any key 
demographic or JTC reasoning variable.).24
Belief  flexibility was also assessed in all groups in rela-
tion to a control belief: “the sun will rise tomorrow.”24,25 
IRR for main belief  items (n = 45; 16 clinical, 19 non-
clinical, 10 control) demonstrated at least substantial 
agreement (ie, kappas >.6 following Landis and Koch26; 
“Possibility of being mistaken”  =  0.77; “Alternative 
Explanations” = 0.86.)
Ratings of Experiential Vs Rational Reasoning Processes. 
A novel method of rating dual-process reasoning was devel-
oped. Responses to belief flexibility and AANEX-CAR2 
appraisal (“what sense do you make of your experiences?”) 
items were transcribed for analysis, since they elicited 
statements reflecting reasoning processes. Definitions of 
rational and experiential reasoning were developed using 
Epstein’s CEST framework,13,27 following Freeman et al.16 
Definitions (see Appendix) were closely tied to recent inte-
grative dual-process theories.28 Interviews were scored 0–2 
(0 = no evidence of reasoning process; 1 = questionable/pos-
sible use; 2 = clear and spontaneous use). Ratings (clinical 
and nonclinical groups) were based on explanations of 
PEs. In the clinical group these included (in addition to de 
facto delusions), biological/biomedical explanations and 
spiritual explanations that showed clear overlap with the 
nonclinical group. The focus on the process of reasoning 
rather than belief content mitigates concerns over tautol-
ogy in particular given that ratings could not be blind to 
belief content. IRR was conducted on 21 (20% of anal-
ysed sample) transcripts (6 clinical, 7 nonclinical, 8 control) 
with an independent blinded rater; agreement for rational 
(kappa = 0.67) and experiential (kappa = 0.71) reasoning 
fell into the “substantial agreement” (0.6–0.8) range.26
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale 3rd Edition—Short Form 
(WAIS-III29). One subtest of each index was adminis-
tered: information (verbal comprehension), block design 
(perceptual organization), arithmetic (working memory), 
and digit symbol (processing speed). Scores were pro-
rated to estimate IQ.
Procedures
Ethical Approval. NRES Committee London–
Westminster (Ref: 12/LO/0766), South London & 
Maudsley/Institute of Psychiatry (SLAM/IoP) R&D 
Office (Ref: R&D2012/047), and BCUHB R&D Office 
(Reference: Jackson/LO/0766). Participants were screened 
over the phone or in person. Eligible participants completed 
all assessments, plus other measures and experimental tasks 
(not reported in this article), and given an honorarium.
Statistical Analysis
Data were analyzed using SPSS version 20. Normally dis-
tributed continuous variables were analyzed using t-tests 
and 1-way ANOVAs. Where deviations from a normal 
distribution could not be corrected by transforming, non-
parametric testing was conducted. Group differences in 
JTC (beads drawn) were analyzed using Mann–Whitney 
(individual group comparisons) and Kruskall–Wallis 
(3-group comparisons) tests. χ2 tests were conducted on 
dichotomised variables: JTC extreme responding (deci-
sion after ≤2 beads), flexible versus nonflexible responses 
to belief  flexibility items and, for experiential/rational 
ratings, “clear and spontaneous use of specific reasoning 
processes” (a maximum rating of 2) vs “no” or only “ques-
tionable evidence” (a rating of 0 or 1).
The view that ANCOVA (analysis of covariance, com-
monly employed in psychological research) or equivalent 
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methods should be used to achieve the goal of “control-
ling for” real group differences has been condemned.30 
We therefore report the group differences on our hypoth-
esized variables without including as covariates in the 
analysis established risk factors for psychosis, on which 
the groups differ (such as IQ, ethnicity, and gender) or 
those inherent to need-for-care status (eg, impaired func-
tioning, anxiety, depression, etc).
Results
Demographics and Clinical Data
The groups did not differ in age (table 1). In line with pre-
vious research, the nonclinical group was more likely to be 
female, and nonclinical and control groups were less likely 
to belong to black or minority ethnic groups, had higher 
IQ, and were more likely to be in education/employ-
ment/training. The nonclinical group had a younger age 
of onset of their PEs than the clinical group, with 77.2% 
reporting voices during their lifetime. Overall they were 
less symptomatic than the clinical group on the SAPS19 
and SANS,31 although not significantly different on the 
AANEX,2 a measure designed to assess anomalous expe-
riences across the psychosis continuum. The nonclinical 
group experienced hallucinations in all modalities as well 
as first-rank symptoms, but scored lower on global delu-
sions (with minimal endorsement of paranoid or grandi-
ose delusions). Ideas of reference were the most commonly 
rated delusion in the nonclinical group, but these were still 
less common than in the clinical group. The nonclinical 
group also reported fewer cognitive difficulties and nega-
tive symptoms (see1 for further information).
Hypothesis 1:  The clinical group will be more likely to show 
the JTC bias than nonclinical and control 
groups, who will not differ from each other.
As predicted the clinical group was significantly more 
likely to demonstrate JTC, both in terms of number of 
beads drawn and percentage showing extreme respond-
ing, compared to the other 2 groups, with small to 
medium effect sizes (table 2).
Hypothesis 2:  The nonclinical and the control groups will 
be more likely to demonstrate belief  flexibility 
about their own beliefs and a control belief, 
than the clinical group.
The hypothesis was not supported, with no differences 
between the clinical and nonclinical groups on belief flex-
ibility items on either the main or control belief (table 3). 
For the main belief, there was a trend (P = .057) toward the 
nonclinical group showing less flexibility on the “possibil-
ity of being mistaken” item compared to the control group.
Hypothesis 3:  JTC will be associated with belief  inflexibil-
ity (possibility of being mistaken) across the 
sample.
The hypothesis was not supported: people with JTC 
(extreme responding) were not more likely to show belief  
inflexibility on either main (χ2(1) = 0.585, P = .445; OR 
[95% CI] = 1.288 [0.673, 2.466]) or control (χ2(1) = 0.464, 
P = .496; OR [95% CI] = 1.249 [0.658, 2.372]) beliefs.
Hypothesis 4:  The nonclinical group will score more highly 
than clinical group on rational reasoning.
The nonclinical group was more likely than the clinical 
group to receive a maximum rating (“clear consistent 
evidence”) for rational reasoning, while the non-
clinical and control group did not differ (table 4 and 
figure  1). The nonclinical group was more likely to 
show experiential reasoning than the clinical group, 
who in turn was more likely to employ it than the con-
trol group. Finally in terms of  use of  a combination 
of  both styles of  reasoning, the nonclinical group was 
more likely to show “clear consistent evidence” of  a 
combination of  both styles of  reasoning than the other 
2 groups.
Additional Exploratory Analysis
Individuals showing clear evidence of rational reason-
ing were more likely to show higher belief  flexibility on 
both the “possibility of being mistaken” (χ2(1) = 4.234, 
P = .040; OR [95% CI] = 2.375 [1.033, 5.459]) and “alter-
native explanations” items (χ2(1) = 6.936, P = .008; OR 
[95% CI] = 3.048 [1.311, 7.083]). This was expected given 
definitional overlap and use of belief  flexibility items 
for ratings of rational reasoning. Individuals showing 
extreme JTC responding were less likely, at trend level, 
to use rational reasoning (χ2(1)  =  3.339, P  =  .068; OR 
[95% CI]  =  2.417 [0.924, 6.322]). Individuals showing 
clear evidence of experiential or “both rational and expe-
riential” reasoning did not show significant differences on 
any of the other reasoning variables (see supplementary 
material).
For reference, additional analysis involving IQ and the 
key reasoning variables are presented in supplementary 
materials. Overall, IQ (when entered alongside group) 
significantly predicted JTC and some (but not all) of the 
other reasoning variables; correlation with beads drawn 
was low (r  =  .260, P < .01) indicating a small effect. 
Gender was not a significant predictor of any dependent 
variable and the addition of gender to regression models 
had no effect on the results.
Discussion
This study investigated whether the established rea-
soning biases of  JTC and belief  flexibility are asso-
ciated with presence of  PEs or with need-for-care 
status, by comparing individuals with persistent PEs, 
with and without need-for-care. It also applied, for 
the first time, a dual-process framework to investi-
gate the process of  explaining (reasoning about) PEs. 
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Reasoning biases were found to differ in people with 
persistent PEs with and without need-for-care. The 
results suggest that an ability to invoke rational rea-
soning processes, together with an absence of  limited 
data gathering (JTC), may protect against the devel-
opment of  need-for-care when persistent PEs are pres-
ent, while marked use of  experiential reasoning is 
associated with the presence of PEs.
Table 1. Demographic and Clinical Data by Group
Clinical (n = 74) Nonclinical (n = 92) Controls (n = 83) Significance tests
London:Bangor 35:39 51:41 43:40
Female (%) 25 (33.8%) 67 (72.8%) 57 (68.7%) χ2(2) = 30.1, P < .001
Mean age (range) 43 (20–78) 46 (18–80) 46 (21–76) F(2,246) = 1.142, P = .321
Ethnicity χ2(2) = 11.2, P = .004 (white 
vs BME) White 71.6% 87.0% 90.4%
 Black 21.6% 6.5% 3.6%
 Dual Heritage 2.7% 3.3% 2.4%
 Asian 2.7% 2.2% 2.4%
 Other 1.4% 1.1% 1.2%
In education/training/employment 18.9% 69.6% 78.3% χ2(2) = 65.2, P < .001
Mean IQ (SD) 89e (11.7) 105b (14.0) 112a (16.5) F(2,225.5) = 54.2, P < .001
Median psychiatric admissions (range) 4d (0–20) N/A N/A
On anti-psychotic medication 89% N/A N/A
Typical 10%
Atypical 55%
Clozapine 24%
>1 antipsychotic 16%
% maximum daily dose; median (range) 50 (12–100)g
Mean age at start of psychotic 
experiences (SD)
22 (10.8) 15 (12.3) N/A t(164) = 3.8, P < .001 (C>NC)
Lifetime voices 87.8% 77.2% N/A χ2(1) = 3.150, P = .08
SAPS total 26.4 (15.4)a 12.2 (7.2)a N/A *P < .001
SAPS hallucinations global rating 3.1 (1.9) 2.4 (1.3) N/A *P = .001
SAPS delusions global rating 3.6 (1.2) 2.3 (1.4) N/A *P < .001
Frequency scoring ≥3 (global delusions) 59/73 37/92 N/A
Frequency scoring ≥3 (persecutory 
delusion)
29/73 1/92
SAPS bizarre behaviour global 0.8 (1.2) 0.1 (0.4) N/A *P < .001
SAPS thought disorder global rating 0.9 (1.2) 0.1 (0.3) N/A *P < .001
SANS total 20.2 (11.8)f 3.0 (3.3)c N/A *P < .001
SANS global ratings total (sum of 5 
global ratings)
8.5 (3.7) 1.5 (1.7)a N/A *P < .001
SAPS somatic/tactile hallucinations 1.4 (1.8) 2.1 (1.7) N/A P = .005
SAPS delusions of reference 2.7 (1.7) 1.7 (1.7) N/A P < .001
SAPS visual hallucinations 1.2 (1.7) 1.6 (1.7) N/A P = .094
SAPS thought insertion 1.8 (1.9) 1.6 (1.7) N/A P = .551
SAPS auditory hallucinations 2.7 (2.2) 1.4 (1.4) N/A P < .001
SAPS mind reading 1.7 (1.9) 1.1 (1.4) N/A P = .047
SAPS olfactory hallucinations 0.5 (1.1) 0.7 (1.2) N/A P = .096
SAPS feelings of being controlled 0.9 (1.7) 0.5 (1.1) N/A P = .093
SAPS voices commenting 1.6 (2.1) 0.3 (1.0) N/A P < .001
SAPS thought broadcast 1.5 (2.0) 0.2 (0.6) N/A P < .001
SAPS voices conversing 1.1 (1.8) 0.2 (0.6) N/A P < .001
SAPS grandiose delusions 0.7 (1.4) 0.2 (0.7) N/A P = .007
SAPS thought withdrawal 0.7 (1.4) 0.1 (0.5) N/A P < .001
SAPS religious delusions 0.7 (1.4) 0.1 (0.4) N/A P < .001
SAPS persecutory delusions 1.9 (1.6) 0.1 (0.4) N/A P < .001
SAPS inappropriate affect 0.3 (0.9) 0.03 (0.3) N/A P = .006
SAPS delusions of jealousy 0.3 (0.7) 0.01 (0.1) N/A P < .001
SAPS delusions of sin/ guilt 0.7 (1.3) 0.01 (0.1) N/A P < .001
SAPS somatic delusions 0.3 (0.9) 0.01 (0.1) N/A P = .001
AANEX total current 30.1 (6.2)b 28.6 (5.1) N/A t(135.0) = 1.327, P = .19
AANEX total lifetime 36.6 (6.6)a 34.8 (4.9) N/A t(130.3) = 1.935, P = .06
Superscript letters represent the number of missing participants as follows: a = 1, b =2, c=3, d = 5, e = 6, f = 7, and g = 10.
*Mann–Whitney tests (all SAPS and SANS scores).
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The novel finding that JTC is not associated with the 
presence of full-blown PEs in the absence of a need-for-
care, offers a new perspective on the causal role of this 
reasoning bias in the context of PEs. Consistent with the 
hypothesized role of reasoning biases in cognitive models 
of psychosis,32,33 we suggest that absence of JTC reduces 
the likelihood of developing maladaptive threat apprais-
als and the resultant characteristic paranoia observed 
in clinical populations.4,5 While the specificity of JTC to 
delusions remains subject to debate, a recent well-con-
ducted meta-analysis has concluded that there is evidence 
for specificity of JTC to delusions.34 Since the unique non-
clinical group in this study is characterized by persistent 
nondistressing PES in the absence of paranoia/distress-
ing delusions, the absence of JTC is consistent with speci-
ficity to distressing delusions and not hallucinations.35,36
As also hypothesized, the clinical group was less likely 
than the other 2 groups to employ rational reasoning 
when explaining their PEs. Thus, those whose PEs were 
associated with a need-for-care, employed less “type 
2,” reflective reasoning; this type of  reasoning assists 
with generating alternative, less distressing, appraisals 
of  these experiences. In contrast, the nonclinical group 
(with PEs but without need-for-care) did not differ 
from controls in rational reasoning, and was equally 
likely to be reflective; consistent with the association 
between rational reasoning and reduced paranoia in 
the general population, suggesting an adaptive role for 
such reasoning.16 However, the nonclinical group did 
also show higher levels of  experiential, “gut” reasoning: 
over 60% showed clear evidence of  both reasoning pro-
cesses. Consistent with these findings, Daalman and col-
leagues37 found that healthy voice-hearers showed high 
levels of  “emotional reasoning” (a bias showing clear 
overlap with experiential reasoning) and Wolfradt and 
colleagues14 reported that a preference for both intuitive 
(“type 1”) and rational (“type 2”) thinking styles leads 
to stronger paranormal beliefs.
Belief  flexibility findings were less clear-cut. While 
there was some evidence of the nonclinical group being 
less likely to accept the possibility of being mistaken than 
controls, there were no differences between the clinical 
and nonclinical group on any item. The rates of flexibility 
reported on the “possibility of being mistaken” item are 
comparable with previous studies6,11; however the focus 
on explanations of experiences rather than delusional 
beliefs per se, may account for the higher than expected 
flexibility in the clinical group on the “alternative expla-
nation” item compared to earlier studies.11,23 The only 
previous study comparing delusions with personally 
significant beliefs24 reported no differences in flexibility 
on the main belief  between deluded, remitted, and con-
trol groups (consistent with current findings), but found 
evidence of greater flexibility in controls on the control/
standard belief. The current study may be considered an 
improvement in terms of larger sample size and more Ta
bl
e 
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stringent criteria for selection of comparison belief  for 
controls.
The dual-process ratings, developed for this study, 
offer a novel way of assessing “online” reasoning in an 
ecologically valid manner. Rational reasoning was asso-
ciated with belief  flexibility and, at trend level, with 
absence of JTC, providing some evidence of convergent 
validity. However, the apparent disparity between explicit 
belief  flexibility responses and the use of rational rea-
soning in the nonclinical group (evidenced by the dual-
process ratings) suggests that while responses to standard 
belief  flexibility questions can predict positive engage-
ment with psychological therapy,11,38,39 these items may be 
less successful in elucidating subtle real-world reasoning 
processes.
The study findings need to be interpreted in the 
context of  certain methodological limitations. The 
cross-sectional nature of  the study means the possibil-
ity cannot be excluded that associations, for example, 
between JTC and need-for-care, may be epiphenom-
enal to, or a consequence of, need-for-care, or relate 
only to specific aspects (eg, presence of  delusions or 
other variables, such as IQ, on which the groups dif-
fer). The current study did not set out to examine the 
role of  neurocognition in need-for-care status and its 
contribution to these reasoning biases. In future, using 
a comprehensive battery, we would recommend further 
examination of  the relationship between IQ, neurocog-
nitive deficits, and belief  flexibility (and dual-process 
reasoning), as has been done previously with the JTC 
bias.40 The novel dual-process findings should also be 
considered preliminary since ratings were conducted on 
only a subset of  the overall sample and they require rep-
lication in a larger, fully-blinded sample. Future work 
should take into account the possibility that clinical 
groups may engage in less reasoning overall (regardless 
of  type) when compared to other groups41 although this 
issue was mitigated in the current study by ratings being Ta
bl
e 
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Fig. 1. Percentage in each group showing clear evidence of 
rational reasoning (RR), experiential reasoning (ER) and both 
ER and RR (stars indicate differences at P ≤ .001 between 
adjacent groups). C, clinical; NC, nonclinical; CON, controls.
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conducted in terms of  presence of  one clear example of 
experiential or rational reasoning rather than frequency 
of  use. The fact that some differences on belief  flexibil-
ity did not reach statistical significance may be attribut-
able to reduced power given the relatively small sample 
size for these analyses specifically.
In summary, this study has found that reasoning biases 
differ in groups with PEs with and without need-for-care. 
People with persistent PEs but without need-for-care did 
not JTC and made more use of rational reasoning than 
those with need-for-care. Therefore, absence of JTC and 
an ability to invoke rational reasoning represent plausible 
protective factors within this unique group. In contrast, a 
high use of experiential reasoning, common to both PE 
groups, may play a role in the occurrence of both benign 
and clinically distressing PEs. It is notable that dual-
process models of reasoning are starting to inform a new 
generation of targeted reasoning interventions, focused 
on constructs such as “fast” and “slow” thinking, with 
promising results.39,42–45 The dynamic nature of real-world 
reasoning is likely to involve a complex interplay of pro-
cesses competing and combining to produce observed 
behavior.28 Gaining a more nuanced understanding of 
how individuals with PEs, with and without a need-for-
care, reason about their experiences will assist in refining 
future developments in clinical interventions for distress-
ing psychosis.
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Appendix 1: Definitions of Reasoning Processes
Experiential reasoning scoring
Type 1 process: fast, high capacity, independent of 
working memory and cognitive ability
Reasoning processes to be rated as experiential in cases of:
1. (Main criteria)—Reasoning clearly tied to affect (feel-
ing, hunches, gut-feelings, vibes, etc) that is, reasoning 
on basis of internal subjective states.
2. Where there is evidence of judgements being made in a 
rapid, nondeliberative manner
 a.  For example, “flashes of understanding/ 
insight,” “sudden revelations,” “sudden shifts in 
understanding.”
3. Where the person expresses the view that their way of 
understanding cannot easily be reduced into words/
logic.
 a.  Where the individual states something akin to “I 
just know”
 b.  Where the individual states something akin to “I 
don’t know if  I can describe what I mean”
 c.  Where an individual states limitations to rationality, 
logic (“some things science can’t understand,” etc).
Rational reasoning processes
Type 2 process: slow, low capacity, heavily dependent on 
working memory and related to individual differences in 
cognitive ability].
Reasoning processes to be rated as rational reasoning on 
the basis of:
1. Evidence of slower, deliberative processing
 a.  describing a process of reflection/analyzing over a 
period of time
 b.  For example, “I have thought long and hard about 
this”
2. Where the person acknowledges applying a logical, 
rational approach to developing their understanding.
 a.  Examples such as “I thought about this, considered 
other possibilities, checked “x” out, asked others,” 
etc.
3. Where the person draws on evidence collected from 
or (or at least available to) other people, that is, third-
person proof/evidence.
4. Where the person acknowledges how they were (at any 
stage) “not certain/ in doubt” about belief.
 a.  For example, “I wasn’t sure, it was hard to work out 
what was going on at the start,” “I’m still not sure.”
5. Specific use of any of the following
 a.  Hypothetical reasoning (“if  . . . then”)—consistent 
with a logical reasoning process.
 b.  Spontaneous use of  “cognitive simulation,” that 
is, the person showing an ability to “decouple” 
from their own understanding to acknowl-
edge other ways of  understanding the same 
experiences.
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Explicit use of probability estimates on the basis that 
this stands opposed to the idea of “just knowing.”
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